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Abstract: The notion of on-balance premise has played a crucial role in understanding the structure of 
conduction. It is a widely accepted view that in any third-pattern conductive argument there is always 
an implicit on-balance premise which represents a judgment that the positive reasons for the conclusion 
have outweighed the counter-considerations against it. This paper aims to provide a critical 
examination of the notion, and to reveal its inadequacy as a theoretical tool. First, it argues that the 
notion of on-balance premise has rested upon a metaphor of outweighing that is too simplistic to 
characterize the weighing and balancing between reasons and counter-considerations. Second, it 
discusses the justification of on-balance premise in third-pattern conductive arguments, and argues that 
the current efforts made to validate the on-balance premise as a missing premise remain to be 
unsuccessful. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a book published in 1971, Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics, Carl 
Wellman coined the term “conduction” and used it to refer to a particular type of 
moral argument that is, as he claims, “left over when all deductive and inductive 
ethical arguments have been studied” (Wellman 1971, p.51). It is further defined as a 
sort of reasoning “in which 1) a conclusion about some individual case 2) is drawn 
non-conclusively 3) from one or more premises about the same case 4) without any 
appeal to other cases.” (p.52) Wellman also believes that conductive arguments can be 
distinguished into three different patterns (pp.55-57), among which the third one is 
specified as the following: 
 
“The third pattern of conduction is that form of argument in which some 
conclusion is drawn from both positive and negative considerations. In this 
pattern reasons against the conclusion are included as well as reasons for it. 
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For example ‘in spite of a certain dissonance, that piece of music is beautiful 
because of its dynamic quality and its final resolution’ or ‘although your lawn 
needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is 
ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow’”. (Wellman 1971, p.57) 
 
The distinctive feature of this pattern, as is indicated here by Wellman, is the 
particular way of drawing a conclusion by means of considering both reasons for and 
against it. For sure, such an argument form captures a special way of arguing that has 
been widely recognized in our argumentative practices, especially in the contexts 
where we are arguing about issues that have a pro-con nature. It is also commonly 
known as “balance-of-considerations argument” or “pro-and-con argument”. As a 
result, since its introduction into the argumentation scholarly community later in 
1980s (Govier 1979, 1987), this third-pattern conduction has attracted much attention 
from argumentation theorists, and it is taken as a unique type of argument that 
justifies a conclusion by means of weighing and balancing between positive reasons 
and counter-considerations.  
Over the last decade, the third-pattern conduction has been strongly advocated as 
“an overlooked type of defeasible reasoning” (Blair & Johnson 2011), and various 
theoretical accounts are developed out from different perspectives for its analysis and 
evaluation (Govier 1999, 2010; Blair & Johnson 2011; Wohlrapp 2011; van Laar 2014; 
Blair 2016; Possin 2016; Xie 2017; Fairclough 2019; Juthe 2019; Bermejo-Luque 
2019; Yu & Zenker 2019). However, there remains to be much controversy over the 
way of pinning down its logical structure, for scholars have differed markedly in their 
views on the role of counter-considerations played in this particular type of argument 
(Freeman 2011; Hansen 2011; Govier 2011; Jin 2011; Blair 2016; Juthe 2019; Liao 
2019; Bermejo-Luque 2019; Xie 2019). In this context, the notion of on-balance 
premise has been recognized by many scholars as a vital tool in understanding the 
logical structure of the third-pattern conduction (for example, Hansen 2011; Govier 
2011; Zenker 2011; Blair 2016, 2017). The basic idea is that in each third-pattern 
conductive argument there is always an implicit on-balance premise which states a 
judgment that the positive reasons adduced for the conclusion have outweighed the 
counter-considerations mentioned in the argument. 
This paper aims to provide a critical examination of the notion of on-balance 
premise, and to argue that it remains to be a theoretical tool in need of further defense 
and developments. On the one hand, it demonstrates that the content of on-balance 
premise, as is currently understood by its proponents, relies upon a metaphor of 
outweighing that has indeed oversimplified the mechanism of weighing underlying 
the third-pattern conductive arguments. On the other hand, by critically discussing 
Hansen’s account on balance-of-considerations arguments (2011), it reveals that 
current efforts to legitimize the presence of on-balance premise in third-pattern 
conduction is unsuccessful (at least till now), hence its supplementation is still in need 
of further justification. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is a brief 
introduction to the notion of on-balance premise, in which I review several structural 
accounts based on that notion, and trace them back to Wellman’s particular view on 
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weighing; then I discuss in sections 3 the metaphor of outweighing and its inadequacy 
in characterizing the weighing between reasons for and against; in sections 4 and 5 I 
examine the missing status of on-balance premise, and argue that its presence in 
conduction remains to be further justified; and I conclude in section 6. 
 
2. A heritage from Wellman 
 
For many scholars who have been interested in theorizing conduction, their views are 
strongly influenced by Wellman’s work. Hence it is not surprising for us to see that 
the notion of on-balance premise is indeed a heritage from Wellman. In his seminal 
work (1971), Wellman has not only introduced the concept of conduction, but also 
proposed an idea of conceiving conductive arguments in terms of a particular model 
of weighing. After noticing that the third pattern of conduction “raises the question of 
how one knows that the reasons for the conclusion are stronger than those against it” 
(p.57), he contends immediately that “perhaps the most popular model for this sort of 
conductive reasoning is weighing. One decides whether the argument is valid by 
weighing the pros against the cons. If properly understood, this model is a good one” 
(p.57). Here by “properly understood”, Wellman means that “the weighing should not 
be thought of as putting each reason on a scale, noting the amount of weight, and then 
calculating the difference between the weight of the reasons for and the reasons 
against” (p.57), for that will suggest a process of weighing which is “too mechanical” 
(p.58). Rather, “one should think of the weighing in terms of the model of 
determining the weight of objects by hefting them in one’s hands” (p.58). As Wellman 
has further clarified, modelling the process of weighing in this way “brings out the 
comparative aspect and the conclusion that one is more than the other without 
suggesting any automatic procedure that would dispense with individual judgment or 
any introduction of units of weight” (p.58). Here it is clear that with this particular 
model of weighing Wellman has highlighted a comparison between the reasons for 
and against, but meanwhile he also resists to unpack it in terms of individual weight. 
Accordingly, weighing between the reasons for and against could only be realized by 
considering their collective strength, and thus become a simple one-time task. 
It is easy to see that the notion of on-balance premise is indeed rooted in this 
Wellmanian view on conduction, for such a premise represents precisely a comparison 
understood in terms of the collective strength, and its supplementation restores an 
argument structure that is based exactly on the model of weighing envisaged by 
Wellman. Wellman’s characterization of conduction has been well endorsed by many 
scholars, and becomes their starting point for understanding the logical structure of 
third-pattern conductive arguments. Accordingly, they take it to be always necessary 
to formulate an “on-balance premise” for the third-pattern conduction, and it is 
believed that the adding of such a missing premise could complete the argument with 
a key component and makes its underlying mechanism of weighing explicit. In this 
line of thought, they have proposed the supplementation of an on-balance premise as 
the proper way for reconstructing third-pattern conductive arguments. A typical 
version of this proposal could be found in a recent paper by Blair (2016, p.124): 
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1.1  a, b, c,…, support p. 
1.2  w, x, y,…, support not-p. 
1.3  a, b, c,… outweigh w, x, y,… (or conversely).  
So,  1  p (or not-p). 
 
Here, obviously, the premise 1.3 is the on-balance premise which states 
specifically a claim that the positive reasons have outweighed the 
counter-considerations in their collective strength. Likewise, we could find that the 
notion of on-balance premise is also present in Govier’s model of conductive 
arguments, which “displays a stage incorporating the on-balance premise, the 
typically implicit claim that supporting considerations outweigh 
counter-considerations” (Govier 2011, p.274). As she further explains, “we can see 
that from this model that (1) there are reasons to accept K, and although (2) there are 
reasons not to accept K, nevertheless (3) the supporting considerations outweigh the 
counter-considerations, so (4) K ” (ibid., italics original). 
In a similar vein, Hansen (2011) proposes a more complicate structure for 
conductive arguments that also includes an on-balance premise (p.39): 
 
 P1:  Independent reason1 (for conclusion K) 
 …… 
Pn:  Independent reasonn (for conclusion K) 
Pn+1: The reasons in P1 to Pn taken together outweigh the independent 
counter-considerations to K, CC1 to CCn taken together  
Conclusion:  K even though CC1 & …& CCn  (inference to ‘even 
though’) 
 
Premise:  K even though CC1 & …& CCn 
Conclusion:  K   (simplification) 
  
Clearly in this model the premise Pn+1 is the on-balance premise, and just as 
Hansen has suggested, all the third-pattern conductive arguments “may be viewed as 
having such an implicit on-balance premise” (Hansen 2011, p.39). Moreover, it has to 
be formulated and supplemented because “identifying a set of opposing 
considerations without indicating that they have been weighed against each other and 
a judgment made about their relative strengths, amounts to no more than indicating 
that there are two sets of reasons each supporting an opposite conclusion” (Hansen 
2011, pp.40-41). In other words, “such a judgment [i.e., the on-balance premise] is 
required to proceed to the conclusion [of third-pattern conductive arguments]” 
(Govier 2011, p.274).  
 
3. The metaphor of outweighing 
 
Although the above idea of structuring third-pattern conductive arguments by means 
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of an on-balance premise seems to be quite feasible and tempting, I suspect that it is 
too simple to fully characterize their underlying mechanism of weighing. For the first, 
as Wellman himself has already recognized, “the degree of support is not 
measurable…because there is no unit of logical force in which to do the calculation” 
(Wellman 1971, p.57), therefore, the idea of collective strength remains to be unclear, 
and a correct understanding of the outweighing relation in the on-balance premise 
would also seem to be difficult. Accordingly, unless we have had an adequate grasp of 
how to take considerations together in weight, otherwise such a relation of 
outweighing can merely be perceived as a metaphor. As a result, the mechanism of 
weighing and balancing underlying the third-pattern conduction would only be 
specified loosely by an analogy with some other similar but more intelligible 
situations, for example, as Wellman has just offered one, like our comparing two piles 
of pebbles by hefting them in our hands (p.58).  
For the second, even if the idea of collective strength is manageable with a 
sufficient model characterizing the accumulation of degrees of support in individual 
reasons, an outweighing relation based solely on collective strength still 
oversimplifies the interactions between the reasons for and against. In general, 
reasons can interact with each other in a variety of ways. When reasons are taken 
together, sometimes their interaction takes the form of increasing or decreasing the 
degree of support, but sometimes not. To some extent, this phenomenon was explored 
by Pollock in his studies on defeasible reasoning (Pollock 1994), and has also been 
well recognized in recent studies on the accrual of arguments in artificial intelligence 
(Prakken 2005). Here we can take Pollock’s distinction between rebutting defeater 
and undercutting defeater as a simple illustration. 
According to Pollock, “information that can mandate the retraction of the 
conclusion of a defeasible argument constitutes a defeater for the argument” (2008, 
p.453). Accordingly, there are two kinds of defeaters that can be distinguished: 
“rebutting defeaters attack the conclusion of a defeasible inference, while 
undercutting defeaters attack the defeasible inference itself.”(p.453) In particular, 
undercutting defeaters can be thought of “as giving us a reason for believing that 
(under the present circumstances) the truth of the premises does not guarantee the 
truth of the conclusion” (p.453). For instance, “your lawn needs cutting” would be a 
rebutting defeater to the argument of “you ought to take your son to the movie 
because the movie is ideal for children”, for that information could count as a reason 
for denying the conclusion. However, to the same argument, “your son doesn’t like 
popular children movies” would be an undercutting defeater, because that information 
gives us a reason to doubt the inference from the premise “the movie is ideal for 
children” to the conclusion “you ought to take your son to the movie”.  
It is easy to see that the notion of defeater as defined by Pollock is very close to 
the understanding of counter-consideration in the discussions on conduction. As 
clarified by Govier,  counter-considerations are “points that are negatively relevant 
to the conclusion” (2010, p.355), or “negatively relevant factors that count against the 
conclusion”(2011, p.266). When understood broadly, counter-considerations, being 
something that could lead to the retraction of a conclusion, can easily be taken as 
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negatively relevant factors against that conclusion. In particular, 
counter-considerations in a third-pattern conductive argument could also be regarded 
as some defeaters to the argument that has the supporting reason(s) and the conclusion 
in that conductive argument as its own premise(s) and conclusion. Likewise, the 
distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters can also be drawn for 
counter-considerations, hence in some way enriching our understanding of the 
mechanism of weighing in conductive arguments. For instance, the following two sets 
of examples could then be further clarified in their different uses of 
counter-considerations: 
 
[1] 
(a) “Although your lawn needs cutting, you still ought to take your son to 
the movie because it is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow.” 
(b) “In spite of a certain dissonance, that piece of music is beautiful 
because of its dynamic quality and its final resolution.” 
 
[2]  
(c) “This morning an officer from the Health department just warned the 
public about the risk of contracting coronavirus in an interview on TV, even 
though his warning is not an official travel alert, we’d better still cancel our 
travel plan immediately and stay at home for the whole week.” 
(d) “The case is similar to the famous Toy Biz, Inc. v. United States case in 
many aspects, although some of these similarities might be disputed, I still 
believe it will just get the same decision.”  
 
Here in arguments (a) and (b), by mentioning the counter-considerations the 
arguer is acknowledging some concern that would lead directly to the falsity (or the 
opposite) of the conclusion. While in arguments (c) and (d), the arguer is indeed 
conceding some concern that, by itself, does not challenge the correctness of the 
conclusion, but more importantly, it is a concern that would only attack the inference 
from the supportive reason to the conclusion.  
Consequently, in light of this parallel between defeaters and 
counter-considerations, we could find that an outweighing relation based merely on 
collective strength now becomes inadequate in characterizing the ways of arguing in 
the third-pattern conductions. Basically, such an outweighing relation can only 
capture the process of weighing in those arguments that include 
counter-considerations of a rebutting type. To be more specific, an outweighing 
relation makes sense only when we are considering two (sets of) reasons that support 
respectively conflicting conclusions (A and not-A), because it is only in this situation 
that we are going to take into account their own weight (or degree of support) and to 
determine which one is stronger, i.e., which one is rebutted by the other. Moreover, it 
could also be contended that a comparison of weight is meaningful only between the 
reasons that support the same conclusion, or between reasons that support conflicting 
conclusions, because the weight of a reason is indeed a relative notion, i.e., a reason 
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has a weight m in support of A. In view of this relativity, it is easy to see that only 
when two reasons are both in support of A, or respectively in support of A and not-A, 
their weights could be compared. But if one reason is in support of A while the other 
in support of B, their weights, even though could both be measured in degree, are not 
comparable, hence to speak about one of them outweighs the other would be 
misleading and inappropriate. Take our previous example, given that “your son 
doesn’t like popular children movies” would be a reason in support of not drawing the 
conclusion “you ought to take your son to the movie” from the premise “the movie is 
ideal for children”, then it will be confusing to say that the reason of “your son 
doesn’t like popular children movies” is stronger than the reason of “the movie is 
ideal for children”, for they are in support of different claims, thus not comparable in 
their weights. 
For this reason, I think it is now clear that an outweighing relation based on 
collective strength is not appropriate for understanding those conductive arguments 
that include counter-considerations of a undercutting type, because the weight of an 
undercutting counter-consideration is in support of neither the conclusion nor its 
opposite, thus it cannot be compared with that of the supportive reasons, no matter 
individually or collectively. Therefore, to conclude, the metaphor of outweighing 
cannot characterize the process of weighing in conductive arguments in a 
comprehensive manner, for it overlooks the fact that supportive reasons and 
counter-consideration can interact in different ways. Accordingly, the notion of 
on-balance premise has only a restricted applicability in structuring the third-pattern 
conductive arguments. 
 
4. The justification of on-balance premise 
 
Besides a simplistic view of weighing and balancing, the notion of on-balance 
premise is also open to doubt in regard to its missing status. Clearly, for any 
third-pattern conductive argument, when presented, it only consists of a conclusion 
and the reasons for and against it. Therefore, as is shown in section 2, the on-balance 
premise has always to be recognized as a missing premise that is to be supplemented 
in reconstruction. However, just as Govier has suggested, a missing premise will need 
to be justified as a premise that is really missing, “you should be prepared to give a 
careful justification for any additions” (2010, p.43). In view of this, I believe that the 
treating of the on-balance premise as a missing premise would also require a 
justification. In other words, it should be defended that such a premise really is a 
claim that is omitted by the arguer in advancing her conductive argument.  
 In order to justify the missing status of on-balance premise in third-pattern 
conductions, Govier has contended that “a person who explicitly acknowledges 
counter-considerations and nevertheless still claims that her conclusion is supported 
by positively relevant premises is committed to the judgment that the positively 
relevant premises outweigh the counter-considerations” (2005, p.397, italics mine; see 
also 2010, p.356; 2011, p.266). Obviously, with such a claim she is suggesting that the 
supplementation of the on-balance premise is reasonable because it is a commitment 
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of the arguer. Moreover, it is easy to see that the reason why the arguer is to be taken 
as committed to such a premise is the arguer’s persistence in reaching the conclusion 
while acknowledging its counter-considerations at the same time. And this persistence 
is indicated by the arguer’s intentional use of some special words to introduce the 
counter-considerations, such as even though, although, notwithstanding, etc. This 
arguer’s commitment view appears to be quite plausible, but it still needs to be 
pointed out that it is indeed built upon a particular understanding of those 
counter-considerations indicators. However, that particular understanding would also 
require some further justification from the linguistic perspective, otherwise it will just 
turn out to be a mere language intuition. 
In a recent paper, Hansen (2011) has tried to establish the linguistic foundation 
that is lacking in Govier’s view. Hansen fully agrees with Govier in claiming that the 
arguer is committed to an on-balance claim when presenting a third-pattern 
conductive argument (p.38), but he further defends it with a careful linguistic analysis 
on the function of indicators like even though and although. Basically, Hansen 
submits that all these linguistic counter-consideration indicators have “a similar 
functional role and meaning in argumentative contexts” (p.42), and then his 
discussion is focused on examining the “even-though” relation, as expressed by using 
“even though” or “although” to introduce a counter-consideration. Based on modern 
logicians’ observation that the expressions of “even though” have some 
non-truth-functional, communicational implications, Hansen first reveals that the use 
of “even though” as a conjunctive operator has a distinguishing effect that “the 
conjunct following it is downplayed in importance while the other conjunct is 
emphasized” (p.44). In other words, two conjuncts will be joined in a rhetorically 
unequal way in the “even though” expressions (ibid.). Then, Hansen further interprets 
this unbalanced importance in “even though” expressions by means of Ducrot’s 
notion of “orientation”, and reaches the conclusion that “even though” is “like ‘but’ 
and ‘however’ in that it connects statements with opposite orientations and represents 
them as being of unequal strength” (p.44, italics added). Specifically, as he explains, 
for a conjunction in the form of “p even though q”, since p and q have opposite 
orientations but its overall direction of implication is opposite to that implied by q, so 
it is indicated that “q, which is nested in the scope of ‘even though’, is represented as 
weaker than p” (p.45, italics added).  
On that basis, Hansen continues to contend, for the argument scheme of “k even 
though q, because p”, it “implies (i) that k is a conclusion and q is a set of reasons 
oriented against, or away from k, and (ii) that p is a set of reasons oriented toward k, 
and (iii) that p is a stronger consideration than q” (p.45). It is easy to note that the 
third part of the implication is a claim identical to the on-balance premise, so here I 
think Hansen is actually trying to validate the on-balance premise as a claim being 
implied by the third-pattern conduction scheme that is built on an even-though 
conjunction. Accordingly, for anyone who advances an argument in the form of “k 
even though q, because p”, i.e., a third-pattern conductive argument, she will have 
intentionally implied, thus also been committed, to an on-balance premise. Clearly, 
this way of justifying the presence of on-balance premise is in line with Govier’s 
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general suggestion that on-balance premise is a commitment of the arguer, but Hansen 
has substantially enhanced Govier’s view by laying for it a linguistic groundwork. 
 
5. The notion of orientation and the unequal strength 
 
However, I think Hansen’s defense for on-balance premise will turn out to be flawed, 
because he has relied too much upon the notion of orientation, a notion that does not 
really lend itself to his purpose. As Hansen has clarified, an orientation means 
particularly “a direction of implication suggested by the conventional meaning of a 
word that will lead us to infer one conclusion rather than another” (p.44, italics 
added). Obviously, this notion presumes, in line with Ducrot’s Radical 
Argumentativism theory, that all sentences are inherently argumentative (van Eemeren 
et al., 2014, p.492), therefore any proposition would be taken as a consideration (or a 
reason) from which we are able to draw a particular conclusion. It is this particular 
presumption that enables Hansen to interpret the effect of unbalanced importance into 
an idea of unequal strength, as understood to be stronger or weaker in argumentative 
force. Hansen has illustrated this point nicely by the example of “The weather is 
beautiful but I am tired” as a response to the suggestion to take a walk. As he explains, 
“the segment ‘the weather is beautiful’ is oriented towards agreeing to the walk and 
the segment ‘but I’m tired’ is oriented towards declining the invitation” (p.44), so here 
both conjuncts are taken as considerations for inferring, respectively, two other 
different conclusions, “I agree to take a walk” and “I do not agree to take a walk”. 
However, since “in but-conjunctions the overall direction of implication is that 
implied by the proposition in the scope of ‘but’”, so the conjunct that is in the scope 
of “but” is stronger than the other in determining the overall final direction (p.44), i.e., 
in drawing the conclusion of its own.  
This linguistic insight was soon extended by Hansen into his analysis of 
even-though conjunctions, from which he concludes in the same manner that for a 
conjunction like “p even though q”, since its overall direction of implication is 
opposite to that implied by q, so it also reveals that “q is represented as weaker than 
p” (p.45). On that basis, he contends in a more general way that it is a semantic 
characteristic of “even though” that the sentence in its scope “is indicated as a weaker 
consideration than the conjunct outside the scope of ‘even though’” (p.46). 
Nevertheless, Hansen’s extension in this analysis is problematic, for that particular 
insight regarding orientation cannot be adapted to even-though conjunctions.  
Take for example a sentence like “I agree to take a walk even though I am tired”, 
it is easy to see that the above analysis in terms of orientation does not fit in the 
conjunct of “I agree to take a walk”, because that conjunct itself is the final end of a 
direction (or the conclusion to be inferred) in the sentence. As a result, it would be 
unnatural to understand it as being further oriented towards somewhere else, and it 
would also be unreasonable if we take it to be leading us to draw a circular inference 
whose conclusion is the same as its premise. Consequently, such a kind of 
inapplicability becomes the cause of a defect in Hansen’s discussion about the 
unequal strength in even-though conjunctions. In particular, it is not clear why the 
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conjunct “I’m tired”, being a consideration oriented towards drawing the conclusion 
“I do not agree to take a walk”, would be weaker in strength than the conjunct “I 
agree to take a walk”, which is exactly the opposite of its intended conclusion. 
However, here Hansen seems to be forcing us to compare between them in order to 
make a judgment about their relative strength, an endeavor that is quite odd and 
questionable.  
As mentioned above, Hansen has not noticed that as a problem and he continues 
to extend this discussion of orientation and unequal strength to his analysis of 
conduction. As a result, he submits that “k even though q, because p” as an argument 
schema will imply that “p is a stronger consideration than q”, i.e., the on-balance 
premise. Here I think a noteworthy inferential leap is taken from a comparison of 
strength within the even-though conjunction (i.e., k is stronger than q) to another one 
that goes beyond the conjunction (i.e., p is stronger than q). It is still unclear how the 
former, even if being correctly confirmed, could be used to establish the latter. More 
specifically, although in such an argument schema it can be said that p and q do have 
opposite orientations, they do not form an even-though conjunction in any way, thus 
their being of unequal strength remains unknown, or still needs to be uncovered by 
some other linguistic clues. Therefore, to sum up, I think Hansen’s analysis of “even 
though” based on Ducrot’s notion of “orientation” also fails to provide a linguistic 
groundwork for validating the presence of on-balance premise in third-patten 
conductive arguments. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have examined critically the notion of on-balance premise that is 
popular in developing a structural account for the third-pattern conduction. It is 
indicated that this notion is originated from Wellman’s particular model of weighing 
which is built upon a comparison between the reasons for and against in terms of 
collective strength. However, such a model is only suitable for characterizing the 
weighing mechanism between positive reasons and the counter-considerations that are 
of the rebutting type. Hence it is further argued that the notion of on-balance premise 
remains to be an immature tool for structuring conductive arguments because it fails 
to capture all the different possible ways of weighing between reasons for and against. 
Moreover, given that the on-balance premise has always been taken as a missing 
premise, the paper also probes into the issue of its justification. In particular, it 
discusses the arguer’s commitment view that is proposed by Govier and fully 
developed by Hansen, and argues that they have failed in justifying the presence of 
on-balance premise in third-patten conductive arguments. As a whole, it is indicated 
that the notion of on-balance premise remains to be a theoretical tool in need of 
further defense and development. 
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